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Immigration, Search, and Loss of Skill 
Yoram Weiss, Tel Aviv University 
Robert M. Sauer, Hebrew University ofJerusalem 
Menachem Gotlibovski, Academic College 
of Tel-Aviv- Yaffo 
This article develops and estimates an on-the-job search model of 
the entry of highly skilled immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
into the Israeli labor market. The estimated parameters of the model, 
together with information on the wages of immigrants from earlier 
waves, imply that, on average, immigrants can expect lifetime earnings 
to fall short of the lifetime earnings of comparable natives by 57%. 
Of this figure, 14 percentage points reflect frictions associated with 
nonemployment and job distribution mismatch, and 43 percentage 
points reflect the gradual adaptation of imported schooling and ex- 
perience to the local labor market. 
I. Introduction 
Starting in late 1989, Israel has experienced a major immigration wave 
of highly skilled workers from the former Soviet Union (USSR). About 
600,000 immigrants entered Israel during the period 1990-95. The average 
level of schooling of these immigrants is high, 14.7 years of schooling for 
males and 14.3 for females. This wave is without precedent in terms of 
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the imbalances that it created in some high-skill occupations. As a result 
of the large-scale immigration, the stock of physicians and engineers in 
Israel almost doubled during the period 1990-93. Under these circum- 
stances, it is not surprising that many highly skilled immigrants were 
forced into low-skill occupations. Among males who were 25-55 years 
old on arrival, only 26% of those who worked as scientists or engineers 
in the former USSR found similar jobs within the first 3 years of their 
stay. The extent of occupational downgrading among females and older 
males was even higher.' 
The purpose of this article is to investigate the observed short-run 
adjustment process in immigrant occupational choices and wages and to 
infer some long-run implications. The main focus is on the loss of human 
capital suffered by the immigrants and the implications of this loss to the 
immigrants themselves and to the Israeli economy. With this purpose in 
mind, a model of on-the-job search is constructed and estimated, using 
panel data on 1,086 male immigrants who reported their labor market 
experience during the period 1990-95. The model is designed to describe 
the process of matching immigrants with jobs in Israel, where workers 
differ in skills and jobs vary by skill requirements. The various jobs in 
the economy are considered to be arranged in a "job hierarchy,"2 where, 
in each occupation, jobs can be ranked according to the minimal level of 
schooling required to perform the job. Finding a suitable job, which 
maximizes the immigrant's output (and wages) given his schooling en- 
dowment, requires a search. An immigrant who meets a particular em- 
ployer will be qualified for the job only if his schooling exceeds the 
minimal requirement. A highly skilled immigrant may accept job offers 
in low-skill occupations because offers in high-skill occupations are more 
rare, and he can continue to search on the job. Generally, workers will 
select occupations and job acceptance rules that do not fully exploit their 
formal schooling. However, with time, immigrants find better matches, 
and their wages rise. 
The panel data on recently arrived immigrants from the former USSR 
are used to estimate the distribution of wage offers and job-offer arrival 
' A downgrading of skills was also observed among immigrants who came from 
the former USSR during the years 1970-80. The skills and occupational com- 
position of these immigrants were similar to the current wave, but their number 
was smaller, about 150,000 (see Flug, Kasir, and Ofer 1992). 
2 The approach was suggested by Melvin Reder (1957). In his view, jobs are 
arranged in a "job hierarchy," in which workers search for the best jobs for which 
they are qualified but, failing to find them, may end up in a less preferred job. 
In a favorable labor market (for workers), job seekers find it relatively easy to 
move up the job hierarchy toward better jobs and vice versa. This occurs because 
fewer workers compete for the good jobs and also because firms relax their hiring 
standards. 
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rates in different occupations in Israel, assuming that immigrants choose 
jobs according to the optimal solution of a dynamic programming problem 
under uncertainty. Based on the estimates, the loss of human capital is 
computed, where loss is defined as the difference between the expected 
actual lifetime earnings and the expected potential lifetime earnings that the 
immigrant would have obtained had he been employed at the same jobs 
and earned the same wages as comparable Israelis. We find substantial loss. 
An upper-bound estimate for the difference between actual earnings and 
potential lifetime earnings is US$253,200, which constitutes 57% of the 
present value of potential earnings over the remaining working life (25 years, 
on average). Nearly 75% of this estimated loss can be attributed to the fact 
that, in each job, immigrants initially earn wages that are about a third of 
the wages of comparable Israelis. Wages of immigrants rise sharply with 
time in Israel but do not fully catch up with the wages of natives (after 30 
years in Israel, immigrants are predicted to earn 15% less on the same jobs). 
The remaining 25% of the loss can be attributed to frictions associated with 
nonemployment and job distribution mismatch. 
While the focus of this article is on a particular episode-recent im- 
migration to Israel-the methods developed here can be applied to other 
situations in which there is a major occupational restructuring, resulting 
from aggregate labor market shocks such as technological innovations and 
changing trade patterns.3 In the model, losses in human capital occur as 
workers with a predetermined level of schooling find themselves with no 
jobs and are willing to compromise and accept jobs with schooling re- 
quirements below their schooling endowment. Even in a smoothly op- 
erating economy, in which individuals can select their schooling and firms 
can choose their job offers, the model predicts some "natural" loss of 
skills, akin to the natural rate of unemployment.4 
II. Background 
The mass immigration of Jews from the former USSR to Israel, which 
started toward the end of 1989, amounted to 600,000 immigrants by the 
end of 1995. The Israeli population at the end of 1989 was 4.56 million, 
and the premigration population growth rate during the 1980s was be- 
3 Several recent studies analyze the unemployment spells and wage losses fol- 
lowing displacement because of plant closure. See, e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993); Carrington and Zaman (1994); and Neal (1995). These studies 
find a substantial and long-lasting loss of wages. 
4 Sicherman (1991, p. 15) noted the prevalence of overeducation using the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. When asked, "How much formal education is re- 
quired to get a job like yours?" about 40% of the respondents reported a number 
that was lower than their own schooling attainment (only 16% of the respondents 
reported a higher number). The author ascribes this discrepancy to a variety of 
reasons, including temporary mismatching and career mobility. 
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tween 1.4% and 1.8% per annum. The 1990-91 wave of immigration 
increased the population by 7.6% in 2 years, which is more than twice 
the normal population growth. The slower immigration flow between 
1992 and 1995 contributed 1.3% a year in population growth. By the end 
of 1995, the recent immigrants constituted 11% of the total population 
and 12.1% of the population ages 15 and above. Compared with immi- 
gration to the United States and other receiving countries, this wave stands 
out in its magnitude. 
Immigrants from the former USSR were highly skilled, as indicated by 
their high level of education and prior experience in academic jobs. Those 
who arrived during 1989-91 possessed an average of 14.5 years of school- 
ing, compared with 12.6 years among Israeli workers in 1991. About 70% 
of the immigrants worked in high-skill and medium-skill occupations in 
the USSR, compared with only 30% among Israeli workers.5 Immigrants 
in this wave are also older than Israeli workers by 4 years. This is in 
contrast with most immigrations, where immigrants tend to be relatively 
young. This latter feature reflects the exogenous relaxation of emigration 
from the former USSR and the free entry of Jews to Israel. Thus, this 
immigration wave is less governed by self-selection. 
Immigrants from the former USSR entered the Israeli labor force 
quickly, willing to accept almost any available job. The occupational dis- 
tribution of first jobs among immigrants is similar to the distribution of 
jobs in the Israeli economy, implying a substantial occupational down- 
grading.6 Following this initial phase, there is a second phase in which 
highly educated immigrants gradually upgrade their positions by finding 
better jobs within low-ranked occupations or move to jobs within high- 
ranked occupations. Consequently, there is a rather sharp increase in 
wages as a function of time spent in Israel. During the period 1990-95, 
the annual growth rate in real wages among immigrants was 6.4%.7 As 
immigrants spend more time in Israel, the variability in wages across 
schooling groups and occupations rises, suggesting improved matching 
of workers to positions and rising returns for skills acquired abroad (see 
Eckstein and Weiss 1998; Friedberg 2000). This process has occurred 
5 By the end of 1993, 57,400 immigrant engineers and 12,200 immigrant phy- 
sicians had arrived. There were 30,200 native engineers and 15,600 native phy- 
sicians in Israel in 1989. 
6 Of the 112,000 immigrants who arrived during 1990-91 with 16 or more years 
of schooling, 75% worked in low-skill occupations, and only 13% found jobs 
in high-skill occupations within their initial stay in Israel (2.9 years on average). 
7 A sharp increase of wages among immigrants is a common finding in most 
studies of immigration, although the reasons are not always clear. See Chiswick 
(1978) and the surveys by Borjas (1994) and LaLonde and Topel (1997). Green 
(1999) describe the process of occupational upgrading among immigrants to 
Canada. 
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Table 1 
Yearly Occupational Distribution in Israel, Males Ages 25-55 on Arrival (%) 
Occupation Occupation Occupation 
1 2 3 No Job N 
Occupation in Israel: 
Year 1 11.6 5.6 56.6 26.2 1,058 
Year 2 17.4 6.9 57.7 17.9 929 
Year 3 22.3 7.2 57.5 13.0 793 
Year 4 27.6 7.5 52.7 12.2 583 
Year 5 36.7 7.8 47.7 7.8 218 
Occupation in the 
former USSR 84.3 4.6 11.0 .0 1,086 
NOTE.-USSR = Soviet Union. 
without much effect on the employment and wages of natives (see Fried- 
berg 2001; Eckstein and Weiss 2002), because of inflows of capital and 
increased exports.s In some professions, such as medicine, collective wage 
bargaining yielded substantial wage hikes for natives, despite the sharp 
increase in supply (see Sussman and Zakai 1998). 
III. Data 
The data sources for this study are two surveys conducted by the 
Brookdale Institute. The first survey, conducted in April-August 1992, 
consists of a random sample of 1,118 immigrants who had arrived from 
the former USSR after 1989. Of this representative sample, 910 immigrants 
were surveyed again during 1994. The second survey, conducted in 
June-December 1995, consists of a random sample of 1,432 immigrants 
who arrived after 1989 and who reported being engineers in the former 
USSR. The two samples are pooled, and the analysis is restricted to males 
between the ages of 25 and 55 at the time of arrival, yielding a sample of 
1,086 immigrants. The respondents' length of stay in Israel ranges from 
6 to 77 months. Each immigrant supplied information on his occupational 
and educational background in the former USSR and a detailed history 
of his work experience in Israel. Sample averages for the variables used 
in the analysis are presented in table Al. 
Occupations in Israel and the former USSR are classified into three 
broad categories, based on their schooling requirements: (1) scientific and 
academic occupations, including government officials; (2) other profes- 
sional occupations, including technical workers, teachers, nurses, and art- 
ists; and (3) all others. Table 1 displays the occupational distribution of 
immigrants in the sample, in the former USSR and in Israel. The basic 
pattern is an initial transition by many immigrants down the occupational 
ladder from occupations 1 and 2 in the former USSR to occupation 3 in 
8 Weak effects of immigration on the wages of natives have also been found in 
the United States. See Altonji and Card (1991); Card (2001). 
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Table 2 
Average Minimal Schooling Requirements of Jobs Held by Immigrants by 
Year and Schooling Acquired in the USSR, Males Ages 25-55 on Arrival 
(Years) 
Schooling Acquired in USSR 
5-12 13-14 15 16 17-22 
Immigrants: 
Year 1 8.9 9.6 10.6 10.7 10.2 
Year 2 9.0 9.8 11.3 11.5 10.7 
Year 3 9.1 9.8 11.7 11.9 10.9 
Year 4 9.2 10.0 12.1 12.5 11.4 
Year 5 9.5 10.5 12.5 13.1 11.7 
Year 6 . .. 11.3 12.3 13.7 12.8 
Israelis 9.9 11.4 12.0 13.3 14.4 
Israel, followed by a gradual recovery. Most of the immigrants, 75%, 
started their work career in Israel as unskilled workers. However, with 
the passage of time, the proportion of immigrants working in occupation 
1 rises sharply from 11.6% in month 12 to 36.7% in month 60. Nonem- 
ployment also declines sharply from 26.2% in month 12 to 7.8% in month 
60. 
Within each broad occupational category, immigrants hold jobs that 
require some minimal level of schooling. The minimum schooling re- 
quirement on a reported two-digit occupation is empirically defined as 
the second decile of the native Israeli distribution of completed schooling 
levels in that same two-digit occupation.' Table 2 reports the average 
schooling requirements of the jobs that immigrants hold, in comparison 
with their imported schooling endowment and the average schooling re- 
quirements of jobs held by Israelis with the same schooling. The figures 
show that immigrants improve their jobs steadily, and after 6 years in 
Israel, the average requirements are similar to those of comparable Israelis. 
An exception is immigrants in the 17-22 years of schooling category.10 
The transition rates associated with the changes in the occupational and 
job distributions are reported in table 3. The transition rates are produced 
by averaging monthly transitions out of each occupation over sample 
months. The figures indicate that entry into occupation 1 is mainly from 
nonemployment. There are also substantial flows from occupations 2 and 
' The native Israeli distribution of completed schooling in each two-digit oc- 
cupation is based on pooled cross-sectional data from the Israel Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) during the period 1991-95. The native distributions are assumed 
to be in a steady state. 
10 Panel data on the occupational upgrading of natives who are new entrants 
to the Israeli labor market are not available for comparison purposes. The CBS 
data suggest that occupational upgrading among natives is slower than among 
immigrants (see Eckstein and Weiss 1998, table A3). 
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Table 3 
Monthly Transitions across Occupations (Averaged, Months 1-71) 
Month t + 1 
Month t Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Occupation 3 No Job 
Occupation 1 .994 .000 .001 .005 
Occupation 2 .006 .975 .003 .015 
Occupation 3 .002 .001 .978 .019 
No Job .018 .009 .093 .881 
3 into nonemployment. Thus, occupational upgrading most often occurs 
indirectly through a spell of nonemployment. 
Although immigrants change jobs quite frequently, most of the im- 
migrants reported an accepted wage only once in their employment his- 
tory. Of the 697 immigrants in the engineers' sample, 571 reported wages 
at the survey date. Of the 389 immigrants in the representative sample, 
102 reported wages once and 233 reported their accepted wages twice or 
more, yielding another 646 wage observations." The total number of wage 
observations is 1,217. Approximately 45% of the reported wages are net 
of taxes.12 Mean wages, by years of stay in Israel, are displayed in table 
4. The figures show that immigrants who work in occupations 1 and 2 
obtain higher wages than those who work in occupation 3. There is also 
a sharp increase in real wages within the sample period. By the sixth year 
in Israel, the average real wage is 78% higher than the average real wage 
in the first year. The overall wage growth results from wage growth within 
jobs and the gradual shift to higher paying jobs and occupations. 
Before specifying the model and estimation procedure, it is useful to 
present descriptive regressions that illustrate some important features of 
the data. The ordinary least squares (OLS) results in table 5 illustrate that 
imported skills, such as schooling and work experience, have virtually no 
effect on wage outcomes during the early years in Israel. Instead, the 
determining factors are the occupation and job that the immigrant holds 
while in Israel. It is, therefore, important to model explicitly the process 
by which immigrants find jobs as well as the decision to accept job offers. 
The results also show that if one controls for the (endogenous) occu- 
pational variables, the knowledge of Hebrew has a small and insignificant 
effect on wages. Moreover, the knowledge of Hebrew is highly correlated 
with occupational history in Israel, suggesting that language acquisition 
" The representative sample was surveyed twice, in 1992 and 1995. The second 
wave includes retrospective wage data. 
12 The questions in each survey slightly differed. Consequently, 26% of the 
reported wages in the engineers' sample are net of taxes, while in the representative 
sample 61% of the reported wages are net of taxes. 
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Table 4 
Average Monthly Reported Wages of Immigrants by Occupation and Years 
since Arrival, Males Ages 25-55 on Arrival (1995 Israeli Shekels = 0.33 U.S. 
Dollars) 
Occupation in Israel 
All 
Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Occupation 3 Occupations 
Year N Wage N Wage N Wage N Wage 
1 6 3,856 1 2,764 71 2,322 78 2,445 
2 26 3,422 32 2,764 189 2,416 247 2,567 
3 33 3,623 11 3,288 155 2,732 199 2,911 
4 41 4,562 14 3,337 163 2,861 218 3,211 
5 92 5,047 29 3,575 202 3,413 323 3,893 
6 57 5,340 10 4,263 83 3,688 150 4,354 
might also be endogenous.13 Given the lack of sufficient information on 
changes in the knowledge of Hebrew, the information on language ability 
is not incorporated into the analysis. 
IV. The Model 
The process by which immigrants gradually find a proper use for their 
imported skills is described through a model of on-the-job search. The 
search model is cast as a finite horizon discrete choice dynamic program- 
ming problem under uncertainty and corresponds to the decision problem 
of a single individual. Individuals are allowed to be heterogeneous, how- 
ever, in both observed and unobserved dimensions. 
Suppose that immigrants vary in their skill endowments and that local 
jobs vary in their minimal skill requirements. The output achieved by 
employing a particular worker on a particular job depends on the match 
between the worker and the job. Specifically, a worker with less skill than 
the required minimum cannot perform the job. A worker with more than 
the required minimum can perform the job and receives a wage that 
depends both on the minimal requirement and the worker's skill level. 
Workers meet employers randomly and receive job offers. The arrival 
rate of job offers and the distribution of jobs differ across occupations. 
Jobs within each occupation j are ranked according to the job's minimal 
skill requirement, s, where s = 0, 1, ... ,S. Occupations are also ranked 
from 1 to J, based on the frequency distribution of jobs, where 1 is the 
occupation containing the highest frequency of jobs with high minimal 
"13 Immigrants reported whether they can understand, speak, write, and read 
professional material at the time of survey in both samples. The representative 
sample also reports speaking ability on arrival. There is no effect of such ability 
on wage outcomes. The knowledge of Hebrew variable does not distinguish much 
among immigrants because of the availability of publicly provided language courses. 
Immigration, Search, and Skills 565 
Table 5 
OLS Monthly Wage Regressions 
Log Wage 
Hebrew Excluded Hebrew Included 
Variable Name Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant 7.729 64.460 7.754 62.977 
Months in Israel .0058 8.322 .0056 7.897 
Job requirement .0275 3.223 .0258 2.996 
Occupation 1 .1836 3.025 .1853 3.022 
Occupation 2 .0196 .445 .0155 .338 
Schooling, -.0071 -1.484 -.0061 -1.227 
Experience0 .0006 .105 -.0024 -.044 
Experienceo -.0002 -1.418 -.0001 -.964 
Physician0 -.1586 -2.273 -.1755 -2.480 
Engineer0 .0129 .034 .0137 .377 
Representative sample -.0950 -2.547 -.0970 -2.506 
Representative 
sample x net -.1307 -4.274 -.1246 -4.016 
Engineers sample x net -.2084 -6.328 -.2071 -6.307 
Knowledge of Hebrew . . . ... .0172 .659 
N 1,217 1,164 
Adjusted R2 .3548 .3503 
NOTE.-OLS = ordinary least squares. A variable with a subscript of 0 indicates value on arrival. 
The variable net indicates the reported wage is net of taxes. 
skill requirements. Occupation J is the occupation with no skill requi- 
rements and a single wage, interpreted as the nonemployment state. Firms 
in different occupations offer a different wage for a given s, depending 
on technology and demand conditions. A local employer in occupation 
j with job s who meets a worker with skill s* extends a job offer if and 
only if s* >_ s. 
If the worker is acceptable to the firm, the worker may 
choose whether to accept the offer. 
Workers have a finite working life, T, and time is discrete, t = 
1,2, ..., T. In any period, a worker can be in one of J x S employment 
states. In any given state, the worker receives a flow of wages and non- 
monetary returns. He may also receive an alternative job offer or a notice 
of immediate job termination. It is assumed that, at most, one job offer 
arrives each period. This offer may be from any one of the J x S jobs. 
The probability of receiving a job offer in any period t is modeled as the 
product of three components, Xkt, Pk(s), and 4k(s > s). The first component of the job offer probability, Xjkt, is the probability 
of meeting an employer in occupation k, given the current employment 
state is in a job in occupation j. Specifying the probability of meeting an 
employer in occupation k as a function of the previous occupation j 
incorporates state dependence.'4 When j = k, jkt, is the probability of 
14 The choice of occupation is equivalent to the choice of subsequent search 
intensity. For reasons of computational tractability, the choice of search intensity 
within occupations is not modeled. 
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meeting a different employer in the same occupation. An immigrant may 
be more likely to meet a new employer in the same occupation in which 
he currently works. There is also a positive probability, given by 
J 
1kt 
that a person in occupation j does not meet another employer in period t. 
The second component of the job offer probability, Pk(s), is the prob- 
ability that the minimal skill requirement for the job is s. This component 
is conditional on having met an employer in occupation k. The last com- 
ponent of the job offer probability, 4k(s* > s), is the probability that the 
worker is acceptable to the firm, or s'* > s. If a job offer arrives, which 
occurs with probability Xk,P,k(s)S* s), the individual decides whether 
to accept the offer by comparing its discounted present value with the 
discounted present value of other feasible alternatives. The other feasible 
alternatives are nonemployment and the current job, unless terminated. 
Job termination is stochastic and occupation specific. The job termination 
probability is denoted as 6,. 
The current period returns on each job are specified as the sum of a 
job-specific wage, 4w,,, and a job-specific monetary equivalent of non- 
monetary returns, nsf,. The value of future wages plus nonmonetary re- 
turns is not known at time t; only the distribution is known. The worker 
thus faces a problem of decision under uncertainty in several dimensions. 
It is assumed that in each period the worker seeks to maximize his re- 
maining expected lifetime income, inclusive of the monetary value of 
nonmonetary returns. 
The remaining expected lifetime income of the individual, in each state 
at time t, can be calculated recursively, using the following system of 
Bellman equations: 
V, = Ws, + n,, + A(1 -  ) 
-1 S 
X,•,>, i Ps') {(s s s')E, max(V,,+, V os,,,V,,+ ) k=1 so= 0 
+[1 - 4k(s: > s')]E, max (Vj,,t+, Vj,,+1) 
J 1 
SJ-1 S 
r E jk,t+l1 EPk(S){k(S* >s')Etmax(VOk,t+l, V.,t+() 
(1) 
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Expression V~ denotes the discounted present value of remaining lifetime 
income in job s in occupation j in month t. Expression A = 1/(1 + r) is 
the discount factor, and r is the monthly interest rate. The first term in 
large parentheses is the value of expected future returns given that the 
current job has not been terminated, and the second term in large paren- 
theses is the value of expected future returns given the current job has 
been terminated. 
The process of transitions from the initial state of nonemployment to 
subsequent jobs, implied by the dynamic optimization problem, has sev- 
eral salient features. The first feature is that transitions lead to improve- 
ments in income (broadly defined to include both wages and nonmonetary 
returns) as long as the worker can maintain his current state. The second 
feature is that it is possible for a worker to accept a job with a lower 
wage or nonmonetary returns if he is compensated in terms of expected 
future income. In choosing jobs, workers examine not only current in- 
come, but also future income prospects, which depend on wage growth 
and alternative job offer and layoff probabilities. Finally, because of the 
frictions embedded in the model, and the possibility of on-the-job search, 
a worker will usually not wait until he gets the best job for which he is 
qualified but will accept jobs for which he is overqualified. Thus, the 
model naturally captures the phenomenon of occupational downgrading 
and loss of skill, but in a dynamic context, allowing for a gradual climb 
up the occupational ladder. 
It should be noted that the model is nonstationary, since wages rise 
with time, and there is a finite horizon."5 These features are crucial for 
the understanding of the behavior of immigrants who arrive in Israel with 
different skills and at different stages of their life cycle. The rewards that 
immigrants obtain for their imported skills are initially very low but then 
rise as they adapt to the new labor market. 
V. Implementation of the Model 
The length of each period t is assumed to be a month. Job offers and 
job terminations occur at the beginning of each month, and wage offers 
adjust accordingly. The length of the planning period is the remainder of 
the immigrant's working life (65 - age at immigration). However, the 
model is solved for each individual, for only the first 72 months since 
arrival in Israel. Terminal values at month 73 are specified to approximate 
the value of anticipated events in subsequent periods. Since it is difficult, 
in general, to find analytical solutions to dynamic programs of this type, 
the model is solved numerically by backward recursion. 
15 There are few empirical applications of on-the-job search models in a non- 
stationary environment. Wolpin (1992) and Sauer (1998) are two recent studies 
of this type. 
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In each month, the immigrant's employment state is assumed to be in 
one of four broad occupational categories. The four occupational cate- 
gories are academic (j = 1), technical (j = 2), blue-collar (j = 3), and 
nonemployment (j = 4). The first component of the job offer probability 
Xkt is specified as 
exp (aikx ,) 
1 + 
k=1 exp(aikxi) (2) 
for j = 1,2, 3, 4 and k = 1,2, 3, where xi, is a vector of individual char- 
acteristics and ak is a vector of parameters. The measured characteristics 
in x, are immigrant's occupation in the former USSR, whether the im- 
migrant was an engineer in the former USSR, whether the immigrant was 
a physician in the former USSR, age at immigrant's arrival in Israel, and 
year of immigrant's arrival in Israel (cohorts 1989-90, 1991, and 1992-95). 
Expression xi, also contains permanent unmeasured characteristics. Each 
immigrant can be one of three unobserved discrete types. The effects of 
being a type 1 immigrant or a type 2 immigrant are estimated relative to 
the benchmark case of being a type 0 immigrant.16 
Schooling is used as the skill relevant to employers for assessing the 
quality of the job-worker match. Each broad occupational category thus 
includes a hierarchy of jobs indexed by their minimal schooling require- 
ment, s, where s is assumed to range from 0 to 21. As noted earlier, the 
second decile of the native Israeli distribution of completed schooling 
levels within each two-digit occupation in Israel determines the minimum 
schooling requirement for that two-digit occupation."7 The resulting em- 
pirical frequency of minimum schooling requirements in broad occupa- 
tional category j defines 1P(s). The second component of the job offer 
probability is thus estimated separately from the model.18 
The third component of the job offer probability 4,(s-* > s) is the prob- 
ability that the immigrant's "true" schooling endowment, s*, exceeds the 
required minimum s of the local employer in occupation j. Each em- 
ployer's assessment of the immigrant's "true" schooling level is idiosyn- 
16 Three types are sufficient to distinguish between absolute and comparative 
advantages in the unobserved ability of immigrants in different occupations. 
17 We attempted to estimate the model without empirically defining the mini- 
mum schooling requirement. However, this introduces a form of serial correlation 
that necessitates high dimensional integrations. 
18 The minimum schooling requirements and their empirical frequencies are 
reported in Weiss, Sauer, and Gotlibovski (2001). Expression P,(s) varies greatly 
by broad occupational category j. 
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cratic and assumed to be a linear function of the immigrant's imported 
schooling s0.19 That is, 
exp( so 
i1(s" > s) = Pr(a + iso + u > s) = , (3) 1 + exp(V - + ) 
where u is assumed to be logistically distributed with zero mean and 
variance v27w2/3. The parameters a and ji provide a simple linear trans- 
lation of schooling acquired abroad into equivalent local units. Thus, the 
expected "true" schooling of an immigrant, who acquired so in the former 
USSR, and who meets an Israeli employer in occupation j, is given by 
s* = a + ls0o (4) 
years. 
It is important to note that the probability that an immigrant receives 
a job offer requiring s could simply be modeled as one component over 
the 18 empirically defined jobs in the choice set, say, XIskso. The identifi- 
cation of the offer probabilities in this case would be driven by the em- 
ployment decisions and accepted wages of the immigrants themselves. 
However, the frequency of the distinct jobs among natives in each oc- 
cupation, Pi(s), is an important determinant of the frequency by which 
immigrants meet employers. The second component of the job offer prob- 
ability adjusts the immigrant job offer arrival rates for this consideration.20 
The third component, 4?(s" >_ s), reflects the sequential nature of obtaining 
a final job offer and the unique importance of imported schooling levels 
in that process. Expression 
X,•,P,(s) 
could thus be thought of as the prob- 
ability of obtaining an interview after which the true schooling endow- 
ment of the immigrant and, hence, the quality of the match is determined 
by the employer. The exclusion of so from X,k, and the restriction of equal 
intercepts in 4j(s*' >_ s) aid in the separate identification of the parameters in this latter component. 
The wage offer in a job requiring a minimum of s years of schooling, 
in occupation j at month t, is given by 
Wsi5 = exp (-y01s + y,1x,), (5) 
where y0,, is the impact of the minimal schooling requirement on output 
in occupation j, x, is a vector of individual characteristics, and -y,i is a 
"9 For analytical simplification, employers do not update their beliefs regarding 
true schooling levels. 
20 One drawback of introducing the separately estimated P,(s) is the effect on 
the standard errors of the estimates of the model. Correcting the standard errors 
could be accomplished by bootstrapping. However, in this setting, it is not com- 
putationally practical. 
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vector of coefficients. The measured characteristics in the wage offer func- 
tion are the schooling and experience the immigrant acquired in the former 
USSR, the immigrant's occupational category in the former USSR, 
whether the immigrant was an engineer in the former USSR, whether the 
immigrant was a physician in the former USSR, the year of arrival in 
Israel (cohorts 1989-90, 1991, and 1992-95) and the time (months) since 
arrival. Expression x, also contains indicators for being a type 1 or type 
2 immigrant, thus incorporating permanent unobserved heterogeneity in 
the wage offer functions. 
Uncertainty in current period returns is assumed to arise from inde- 
pendently and identically distributed shocks to the nonmonetary benefits 
in each employment state, given by 
nsjt = bi, + ve,st, (6) 
where bi, = (ek, - 1)wsy, and j = 1,2,3. This specification forces the de- 
terministic component of nonmonetary returns to remain a fixed pro- 
portion of the wage in each period. In nonemployment, j = 4 and 
b = 580ek4ooC1+k420cc2. 
This latter specification implies that low-skill immigrants, who worked 
in occupation 3 in the former USSR, receive nonemployment benefits of 
580 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per month.21 Immigrants with more skills 
are allowed to have a higher value of nonemployment, mainly because 
they can exploit the period of nonemployment for training. It is thus 
possible to estimate the implicit average value of training for immigrants 
who worked in occupations 1 and 2 in the former USSR.22 
The error terms e,1,, in equation (6), take different values in each of the 
19 (J x S) elements of the choice set in month t, enter linearly in the 
value functions, and are assumed to follow the type 1 extreme value 
distribution, with zero mean and variance 7r2/6. These assumptions enable 
the use of a closed-form expression for expected maximum future returns. 
Specifically, 
E, max (V,,,+,, Vok,t+1, V4,,+,) 
V\ V__,. _ 
= ln exp + exp) + exp ( ), (7) 
VI 
V 
21 The amount 580 NIS is the average level of unemployment benefits received 
by the immigrants during the sample period. A particular number is needed for 
identification purposes. 
22 Eckstein and Cohen (2000) explicitly model the choice to participate in an 
immigrant training program. 
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where V, denotes the mean value of being in job s in occupation j at 
period t, and v is a parameter that regulates the relative importance of 
nonmonetary returns or the variance of the shocks (see Rust 1994). 
Note that uncertainty in current period returns could have been mod- 
eled as a multiplicative shock to the wage function rather than as a linear 
shock to nonmonetary returns. However, this strategy would rule out 
the use of the exact closed form in equation (7) and necessitate the use 
of Monte Carlo integration techniques to approximate the expected max- 
imum return function.23 Another alternative is to have the wage function 
enter linearly in the value functions and to interpret the shock as affecting 
wages instead of nonmonetary returns. However, this latter strategy does 
not ensure that wage offers will always be greater than zero. 
The terminal value functions for each element in the choice set are 
assumed to be proportional to the current period returns in month 73, 
with a correction for finite life, or retirement at age 65. Specifically, 
1 + q' 
Vs73 1 -- q (ws73 + ns173) exp (y,) (8) 1-q 
for j = 1,2,3, where q = 1/(1 + r), (1 + q)/(1 - q) = ET, (1 + r)'-, 
and T = 65 - age at immigration. The monthly interest rate is fixed at 
6%. This relatively high rate is chosen to reflect the fact that immigrants 
had almost no initial assets and face borrowing constraints.24 The pro- 
portionality constants yj and j = 1,2, 3 are estimable parameters and par- 
simoniously capture the implicit value of future events. 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. For a given vector of 
trial parameters, the dynamic program is solved by backward recursion 
for each immigrant-type combination. Given the type-specific expected 
value functions for each individual in every state in each month, the 
estimation problem is reduced to a static panel data multinomial logit 
with a discrete distribution for individual effects (Heckman and Singer 
23 The incorporation of endogenously accumulated job or occupation-specific 
work experience in the model is also economically desirable but would similarly 
necessitate the use of approximate solution techniques to solve the dynamic pro- 
gram (see Keane and Wolpin 1994). Approximate solution techniques have the 
drawback of requiring stronger conditions for consistent estimation. 
24 We attempted to estimate the interest rate along with the other parameters 
of the model but were not successful. The interest rate could not be separated 
from the arrival rates of job offers. 
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1984). The assumptions on s~, allow the choice probabilities to be cal- 
culated according to the closed form 
Pr 
(Vokt_ V,, VssOkt > 
V4,) 
exp [(Vkt - V4Y)/'] 
1 + exp [(X, - V4,)/v] + exp [(V k - V4)/](9) 
Observed wages on accepted jobs are incorporated into the estimation 
by multiplying the choice probability in month t by the measurement 
error density in the reported wage. Measurement error in reported wages 
is assumed to be lognormally distributed with estimable variance a2. The 
mean of the measurement error is specified as a linear function (with 
interactions) of the subsample from which the observation was taken 
(engineer or representative), and as a dummy for whether the reported 
wage is net of taxes.25 
The individual's unconditional likelihood contribution is constructed 
by computing a weighted average over the individual's three type-specific 
likelihood contributions. The weights are specified to be a multinomial 
logistic function of the subsample indicator, thus allowing for heterosce- 
dasticity in the distribution of mass points. The parameters of the model 
are recovered by solving the dynamic program and constructing the like- 
lihood contributions for each iteration of the optimization algorithm. The 
solution to the dynamic program, the inclusion of permanent unobserved 
heterogeneity, and the joint estimation of the wage functions and choice 
probabilities correct the wage function estimates for biases resulting from 
self-selection. 
VI. Results 
This section discusses specific parameter estimates of interest and high- 
lights the main features of the model. The parameter estimates and their 
associated standard errors are presented in table A2.26 
A. Wages 
The estimated parameters of the wage offer functions indicate that the 
returns that immigrants obtain in Israel for potential work experience in 
the former USSR are very small in occupations 1 and 3. In occupation 
2, returns are relatively higher but still small in magnitude. By contrast, 
experience accumulated in Israel during the first 6 years, as proxied by 
25 The subsample indicator and the net wage indicator thus appear in the density 
of the measurement error, not in the wage offer functions. 
26 There are 104 estimated parameters. Standard errors are calculated by using 
numerical derivatives and the outer product approximation to the Hessian. 
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time in Israel, has a substantial positive effect of 0.00665 per month (8.0% 
annually) in occupations 1 and 2. In occupation 3, experience accumulated 
in Israel has a slightly smaller but still substantial positive effect of 0.00649 
per month (7.8% annually). 
The impact of imported schooling on wages, on any given job for which 
schooling exceeds the minimal requirement, is negligible in occupation 3, 
slightly negative in occupation 1, and somewhat more negative in occu- 
pation 2. However, higher imported schooling levels are associated with 
a higher probability of obtaining a job with a greater minimal schooling 
requirement. Imported schooling is thus quite important in determining 
lifetime earnings. Immigrants who find jobs with higher schooling re- 
quirements obtain a wage increase of 3.3% per year of required schooling 
in occupations 1 and 2 and 1.1% in occupation 3.27 The model thus 
captures the two main features of the wage data: increasing mean wages 
over time and rising inequality. The rising inequality results from the 
gradual move of immigrants with higher schooling levels into jobs that 
have higher minimal schooling requirements. 
The effects of other imported characteristics on wage offers are generally 
not statistically significant. The exceptions are the significant positive ef- 
fect in occupation 2 of having been an engineer and the significant negative 
effect of having been a physician in occupations 1 and 3. The results also 
indicate that unobserved types 1 and 2 obtain substantially lower wages 
than unobserved type 0 in all occupations. Type 1 is penalized mainly in 
occupations 2 and 3, while type 2 is penalized mainly in occupations 1 
and 3. 
B. Nonmonetary Returns 
The variance component v of nonmonetary returns is estimated to be 
3,267 NIS. Thus, a nonmonetary shock of one standard deviation, which 
under the extreme value distribution occurs with a probability of about 
13%, has an effect that is approximately equal to the mean wage in the 
sample, 3,304 NIS. This suggests that nonmonetary shocks can play an 
important role. One feature of the data that influences this result is the 
presence of transitions, mainly within occupation 3, into jobs with lower 
minimal schooling requirements and lower wages. 
The estimates for the deterministic component of nonmonetary returns, 
kj,j = 1,2, 3, imply that mean nonmonetary benefits are zero for jobs in 
occupation 1, 16% of the wage in occupation 2, and 18% of the wage in 
27 A linear projection of first-period expected value functions on imported 
schooling and age on arrival yields a highly significant return to schooling of 
4.3%. The return to imported schooling remains highly significant but decreases 
in magnitude to 1.6% when the other imported characteristics, except occupation 
in the former USSR, are added to the regression. 
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Table 6 
Predicted Meeting and Choice Probabilities by Occupation and Type 
Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Occupation 3 
Type Type Type No Job Type 
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
Meeting Probabilities 
Prior occupation: 
Occupation 1 .032 .002 .013 .003 .000 .002 .003 .001 .003 ......... 
Occupation 2 .016 .001 .005 .023 .003 .019 .014 .003 .018 ......... 
Occupation 3 .005 .000 .002 .004 .000 .003 .039 .008 .049 .... .... ... 
No job .032 .002 .011 .013 .002 .011 .125 .029 .158 .... .... ... 
Choice Probabilities 
Month: 
12 .164 .017 .048 .055 .015 .060 .564 .168 .583 .216 .800 .309 
24 .229 .034 .066 .060 .027 .092 .627 .245 .643 .085 .694 .200 
36 .278 .050 .080 .058 .038 .115 .610 .298 .654 .054 .615 .151 
48 .333 .067 .099 .056 .049 .147 .569 .321 .645 .042 .563 .109 
60 .386 .083 .109 .056 .059 .175 .520 .301 .634 .037 .557 .081 
occupation 3. However, the kj's are not significantly different from zero.28 
The estimate of k4, implies that immigrants from occupation 1 in the 
former USSR value nonemployment benefits by 45% more than unskilled 
immigrants from occupation 3. The estimate ofk42 implies that immigrants 
from occupation 2 value nonemployment benefits by 5.3% more than 
unskilled immigrants. The additional benefit among skilled immigrants 
may reflect the value of training programs in which many of these workers 
participated.29 
C. Job Offer and Job Termination Probabilities 
The first panel of table 6 presents the estimated average values of X,kt 
for each unobserved type of immigrant.30 There are large differences in 
these probabilities. The estimates imply that type 0 immigrants meet sub- 
stantially more employers in occupation 1. Type 1 and type 2 immigrants 
28 This is because of correlation with the terminal value parameters, which also 
influence the value of a job within the sample period. The terminal value param- 
eters are highly significant. 
29 Approximately 60% of male immigrants from occupations 1 and 2 in the 
former USSR participated in job training programs. Immigrant job training is 
provided by the government and lasts 6 months, on average. 
30 The meeting probabilities, choice probabilities, and predicted quantities for 
assessing model fit are calculated by drawing from the distributions of the model's 
random elements, simulating a choice history for each individual 10,000 times 
and averaging over all simulations and individuals. 
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meet employers mainly in occupation 3. The meeting probabilities are 
generally higher from nonemployment for all types.31 
The estimated values of X4,, for types 0, 1, and 2 are 0.032, 0.002, and 
0.011, respectively. The estimated values of X43, are much higher, 0.129, 
0.029, and 0.165 for the three types, respectively. Thus, from nonem- 
ployment, a type 0 immigrant's expected waiting time to meet an employer 
in occupation 1 is 29 months, while his expected waiting time to meet an 
employer in occupation 3 is only 8 months. These estimates reflect the 
market conditions that immigrants face on entry. It is much easier for 
them to find jobs as unskilled workers. 
Based on the estimated parameters of Xit,) it is further noted that older 
individuals, and those who arrived in Israel in later years, face lower 
probabilities of meeting employers in occupations 1 and 2. This reflects 
possible changes in cohort quality and "congestion" effects in Israel. As 
expected, the occupational category in the former USSR is an important 
signal for Israeli employers. Immigrants who worked in occupation 1 in 
the former USSR meet substantially more employers in occupation 1 in 
Israel. In comparison with all others who worked in occupation 1 in the 
former USSR, engineers meet fewer employers in occupation 1, while 
physicians meet more. 
The estimated 
4,(s*:_ 
s), the probability of being accepted to a job 
having already met an employer, yields the following quality adjustment 
for imported schooling: 
si = 10.072 + 0.456s0, 
s2 = 10.072 + 0.270so, (10) 
s3 = 10.072 + 0.080s0. 
The marginal effects of imported schooling are thus 0.456 in occupation 
1, 0.270 in occupation 2, and 0.080 in occupation 3. The corresponding 
"break even" levels are 19, 14, and 11 years of schooling in occupations 
1, 2, and 3, respectively. For comparability with Israelis, imported school- 
ing is adjusted downward (upward) if it is above (below) the break-even 
level. 
The estimated acceptance probabilities, which depend also on the es- 
timated variances, imply that, in occupation 1, immigrants are accepted 
with probability close to one into jobs that require less than their imported 
schooling, so. They are also accepted with a positive probability into jobs 
requiring slightly more schooling than they possess. For example, an 
immigrant with 15 years of imported schooling is accepted with proba- 
31 For example, the probability of meeting an employer in occupation 1 is 
higher from nonemployment than from jobs in occupation 3 and occupation 2 
(341t 
3 
> 331t > X21t)* 
576 Weiss et al. 
bilities of 0.909, 0.451, and 0.063 to jobs requiring 16, 17, and 18 years 
of schooling, respectively. 
These results reflect the fact that, in the former USSR, one could become 
an engineer (physician) by going to elementary and high school for 10 
years, followed by 5 (6) years of university training. Immigrants who find 
jobs in occupation 1 as doctors or engineers are treated as if they have 
schooling comparable with Israelis, that is, 16 (18) years of schooling. In 
occupation 3, practically everyone is accepted to jobs requiring 10 years 
or less, but the best jobs in this occupation, requiring 12 years of school- 
ing, are generally not available to immigrants, even with a high level of 
schooling. Similarly, immigrants with a high level of schooling have only 
a small probability of being in jobs requiring 16 years of schooling in 
occupation 2. Stated differently, immigrants have a lower probability than 
Israelis for receiving the top offers in occupations 2 and 3. 
The estimates of 6i, the probabilities of involuntary job separation, are 
0.0035, 0.0081, and 0.0052 in occupations, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The 
termination probabilities are small but highly significant. The estimates 
imply that immigrants can hold on to their jobs for long periods of time 
(24, 10, and 16 years, respectively) unless they decide to quit. 
D. Choice Probabilities and Types 
The second panel of table 6 displays the predicted occupational choice 
distribution by unobserved type for selected months after immigration. 
The figures show that, in occupation 1, the proportion of each type of 
immigrant grows over time but that there is a much higher proportion 
of type 0 immigrants in each month. Moreover, the proportion of type 
0 immigrants increases at the fastest rate. The strong selection on unob- 
servables is illustrated by the prediction that, in month 60, 89% of those 
working in occupation 1 are type 0 immigrants. The estimated proba- 
bilities of being a type 0 immigrant are 0.55 in the representative sample 
and 0.76 in the engineers' sample. 
In occupation 2, the proportion of type 2 immigrants is the highest in 
each month and grows at the fastest rate. In occupation 3, the proportion 
of each type of immigrant rises to a peak and subsequently falls. The peak 
occurs earlier for type 0 and type 2 immigrants. In nonemployment, the 
proportion of type 1 immigrants is clearly the highest. Nonemployment 
falls sharply for type 0 and type 2 and only gradually for type 1 immi- 
grants. In month 60, 42% of those in nonemployment are type 1 im- 
migrants. The probabilities of being a type 1 immigrant are 0.04 and 0.07 
in the representative sample and the engineers' sample, respectively. 
The choice frequency patterns are explained by the willingness of a 
nonemployed type 0 immigrant to accept almost any job offer in the early 
months after arrival. However, as his occupational status in Israel im- 
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proves, he accepts fewer offers outside of occupation 1. A type 1 im- 
migrant is reluctant to accept offers from occupation 3 in which his wage 
penalty is highest. A type 1 immigrant waits for offers in occupation 1, 
but these offers arrive with a very low frequency. In contrast, a type 2 
immigrant accepts offers mainly from occupation 2, in which his wage 
penalty is the lowest. 
Based on the sign patterns of the model's estimated parameters, type 
0 may be considered the high-ability type, type 1 the low-ability type, 
and type 2 the intermediate-ability type. Type 0 immigrants obtain higher 
wages and receive more job offers in occupation 1. The penalties for lower 
ability, in terms of lower wages or fewer job offers, are substantial. Despite 
an absolute disadvantage in occupation 1, type 1 has a comparative ad- 
vantage in this occupation, while type 2 has a comparative advantage in 
occupation 2. 
VII. Model Fit 
Figure 1 displays the actual and predicted choice frequencies in each 
occupation over the first 60 months since arrival.32 The model captures 
quite well the sharp decline in nonemployment, the sharp rise and subse- 
quent fall in the proportion of workers in unskilled jobs, and the gradual 
increase in the proportion of skilled workers. The sharp decline in nonem- 
ployment results from the willingness of skilled workers to accept em- 
ployment in unskilled jobs. The subsequent fall in the proportion of work- 
ers in unskilled jobs results from the eventual occupational upgrading of 
skilled workers. Unadjusted x2 test statistics indicate that differences be- 
tween the actual and predicted choice frequencies over the four occupations 
are not significant, at the 5% level, in 54 out of 72 months.33 
The model is also capable of reproducing the observed transitions be- 
tween occupational states reported in table 3.34 The time patterns in the 
actual and predicted transition rates to and from nonemployment, over 
the first 60 months since arrival, are illustrated in figure 2. Note that the 
decline in the exit rate from nonemployment and the decline in the reentry 
rate into nonemployment are captured without relying on time effects in 
the arrival rate of job offers. The decline in the reentry rate into nonem- 
ployment occurs as wages rise sharply over time and the opportunity cost 
32 The sample size between months 61 and 72 is much smaller than prior to 
month 60. 
" A single X2 test over the 72 months indicates that the actual and predicted 
choice distributions are significantly different. This mainly results from the misses 
in months 1-8 and 16-23. 
34 On the basis of a x2 test, the hypothesis that the actual and predicted transition 
matrices are identical is not rejected. 
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FIG. 1.-Actual and predicted choice frequencies 
of searching efficiently in nonemployment rises.35 The decline in the exit 
rate from nonemployment is a result of the changing mix of unobserved 
types in the population of the nonemployed over time. Type 0 and type 
2 immigrants have relatively high exit rates. Thus, in the later months, 
the population of the nonemployed consists mainly of low-exit-rate type 
1 immigrants. Chi-square tests indicate that the actual and predicted exit 
rates from nonemployment are not significantly different in 63 out of 72 
months.36 The actual and predicted reentry rates into nonemployment are 
not significantly different in 68 out of 72 months.37 
5 Layoffs and random shocks to nonmonetary returns induce transitions into 
nonemployment. Voluntary transitions into nonemployment reflect, in part, par- 
ticipation in training programs. 
36 A single X2 test over the 72 months indicates that actual and predicted tran- 
sitions out of nonemployment are significantly different. This mainly results from 
misses in months 2-9. 
37 A single x2 test over the 72 months indicates that the actual and predicted 
reentry rates into nonemployment are not significantly different. 
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Table 7 presents the actual and predicted mean accepted wages in each 
occupation-job category as well as predicted mean accepted wages by 
type. Predicted wages track observed wages quite well for the cells in 
which there are a substantial number of wage observations. The simple 
correlation between actual and predicted wages is 0.602 in logs. Although 
the maximum likelihood estimation adjusts the coefficients of the wage 
functions to fit both the wages and occupational choices, it yields a wage 
fit that exceeds the fit of a reduced-form log-linear regression of wages 
on the same exogenous variables that appear in the structural model (0.519 
in logs). For comparison purposes, the predicted values from the second 
OLS regression specification in table 5, which includes the endogenous 
job choice variables, are also displayed."3 
Finally, it should be noted that the model mimics quite well the average 
proportions of stayers and movers from period t to period t + 1." Stayers 
38 The OLS regression is similar but not identical to the wage functions estimated 
in the model. For example, the regression is not estimated separately for each 
occupation and does not include controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The cor- 
responding measure of fit is 0.592 in logs. 
39 The actual and predicted figures are reported in Weiss et al. (2001). 
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Table 7 
Actual and Predicted Monthly Wages by Occupation, Job and Type (1995 
Israeli Shekels= 0.33 U.S. Dollars) 
Occupation No. with Actual Predicted Wages 
and Job Wages > 0 Wages Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 All OLS 
3,2 5 2,023 2,920 1,004 2,070 2,587 3,047 
3,6 3 2,983 3,093 1,058 2,193 2,734 2,538 
3,8 294 2,649 3,193 1,080 2,250 2,855 3,043 
3,9 126 3,184 3,252 1,092 2,287 2,928 3,353 
3,10 304 2,909 3,315 1,106 2,329 2,999 3,308 
3,11 116 3,178 3,377 1,118 2,374 3,073 3,472 
3,12 15 3,656 3,429 1,130 2,419 3,145 3,818 
2,12 82 3,290 3,521 1,726 2,996 3,267 3,517 
2,14 14 3,421 3,857 1,848 3,227 3,617 3,120 
2,16 1 2,742 3,983 1,913 3,323 3,761 2,871 
1,12 12 3,761 3,861 3,465 2,568 3,738 4314 
1,15 11 3,878 4,355 3,823 2,957 4,210 4,125 
1,16 209 4,799 4,568 3,960 3,107 4,426 4,485 
1,17 6 4,908 4,752 4,089 3,216 4,618 3,606 
1,18 17 3,950 4,850 4,173 3,269 4,708 3,496 
NOTE.--OLS = ordinary least squares. 
are defined as those immigrants who do not change their jobs. Movers 
are subdivided into job changers within and across occupations. Movers 
within occupations have a predicted average monthly wage growth of 2%, 
and movers across occupations have a substantial average wage growth 
of 18.3%. However, such switches are rare and occur in only 1.1% of 
the time periods. The average annual growth rate in wages for employed 
workers is 8.82% a year. Approximately 18% of the annual wage growth 
can be attributed to job switches. The predicted impact of job changes 
on wage growth is thus quite large.40 
VIII. Loss of Human Capital 
In order to assess the magnitude of the costs of immigration associated 
with frictions and imperfect transferability of skills, the mean simulated 
earnings (actual earnings) of each immigrant, in each period, is compared 
with two hypothetical values. The first hypothetical value (potentiall 
earnings) is the mean potential earnings of the immigrant, in each period, 
over a counterfactual job distribution. The counterfactual job distribution 
is the distribution of minimal schooling requirements among native Israeli 
workers with the same years of schooling as the "true" schooling en- 
dowment of the immigrant, s*. The predicted wages on each job in the 
counterfactual job distribution is computed according to the estimated 
4o These results are similar to reduced form estimates, based on pooled cross- 
section data for the period 1991-95, presented in Eckstein and Weiss (1998). Apart 
from the differences in the samples, the main methodological difference in the 
study presented here is that occupational switches are endogenously determined. 
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immigrant wage offer functions.41 The second hypothetical value (poten- 
tial2 earnings) is the mean potential earnings of the immigrant, over the 
same counterfactual job distribution as in potentiall earnings, but with 
predicted wages on each job computed according to the parameters of a 
native Israeli wage regression.42 The difference between potentiall earn- 
ings and actual earnings is a measure of earnings loss resulting from fric- 
tions (job distribution mismatch), and the difference between potential2 
earnings and potentiall earnings is a measure of earnings loss resulting 
from a lower market valuation of imported skills. 
The actual and potential earnings of each immigrant are computed from 
their age when they arrived in Israel until retirement at age 65. The meth- 
odology used to solve the dynamic program past month 72 (the horizon 
of the model) is outlined in appendix B. Figure 3 displays the time paths 
of simulated actual and potential earnings for immigrants who worked 
in occupation 1 in the former USSR, by age group at arrival. The simulated 
actual earnings of immigrants are always below their simulated potential 
earnings, but the gap closes with the duration of time in Israel. The change 
over time in potential2 earnings is driven by the immigrants' increase in 
local work experience, where the impact of total work experience (im- 
ported plus local) is evaluated using the native Israeli regression coeffi- 
cients. The sharp rise in potentiall earnings reflects the higher return that 
immigrants obtain for local work experience using the coefficients of the 
immigrant wage functions.43 The even sharper rise in simulated actual 
earnings occurs as the distribution of jobs that immigrants hold changes 
over time. That is, the strong wage growth is accompanied by a movement 
into higher paying jobs and occupations. 
There are marked differences in the time paths of actual and potential 
earnings between age groups. Younger immigrants (younger than age 40 
on arrival) initially earn half of their potential but gradually close the gap. 
After 25 years in Israel, these immigrants earn 70% of what they would 
have earned as native Israelis. The gap in earnings in year 25 is evenly 
divided between job distribution mismatch and a lower market valuation 
of imported skills. Older immigrants (older than 40 on arrival) initially 
41 Since s* is occupation specific, there is a counterfactual job distribution and 
corresponding mean wage in each occupation. The potential wage is thus defined 
as the maximum over the mean wages in each occupation. In order to not overstate 
this maximum, restrictions were imposed according to the occupation of the 
immigrant in the former USSR. 
42 The regression parameters are estimated by nonlinear least squares using data 
on 8,178 workers (selected from the Israel CBS Income Surveys 1991-94). The 
regression specification and results are reported in Weiss, Sauer, and Gotlibovski (2001). 
43 The higher return mainly results from rising returns to imported skills and 
complementarity between local and imported human capital (see Eckstein and 
Weiss 1998). 
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FIG. 3.-Simulated actual and potential earnings of immigrants (1995 Israeli shekels = 
.33 in U.S. dollars). 
earn the same as younger immigrants, but these earnings constitute only 
a third of their potential, indicating negligible initial returns to imported 
work experience. As time since immigration advances, the rewards for 
imported skills rise for both younger and older immigrants, but the oc- 
cupational status of older immigrants is substantially lower. Among older 
immigrants who worked in occupation 1 in the former USSR, 20% are 
predicted to be employed in occupation 1 in Israel 5 years after immi- 
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Table 8 
Discounted Present Value of Lifetime Earnings Loss Males Ages 25-55 
Arrival (1995 Israeli Shekels = 0.33 U.S. Dollars) 
Loss Resulting Loss Resulting 
from Frictions from Prices Total Loss 
Sample Attributes Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
Years of schooling: 
5-12 95,478 12.09 199,138 25.22 294,616 37.31 
13-14 107,339 10.71 388,671 38.77 496,010 49.48 
15 217,551 16.16 463,901 34.47 681,452 50.63 
16 201,460 14.44 597,821 42.85 799,281 57.29 
17-22 191,544 12.38 797,774 51.54 989,318 63.92 
Occupation in the 
former USSR: 
1 211,498 14.63 619,855 42.88 831,353 57.51 
2 112,560 10.12 531,082 47.77 643,642 57.89 
3 46,930 5.91 282,630 35.58 329,560 41.49 
Engineer 215,763 14.94 606,737 42.01 822,500 56.95 
Physician 150,934 9.46 880,462 55.18 1,031,396 64.64 
Age on arrival: 
< 40 219,501 15.35 445,472 31.15 664,973 46.50 
40 + 160,201 12.4 702,088 54.36 862,289 66.76 
Year of arrival: 
1989-90 184,479 13.39 564,693 40.99 749,172 54.38 
1991 171,185 13.23 557,145 43.06 728,330 56.29 
1992-95 214,196 15.44 625,247 45.07 839,443 60.51 
All: 
r = .06 188,759 13.89 578,506 42.59 767,265 56.48 
r = .03 262,438 14.37 722,253 39.55 984,691 53.92 
NOTE.-USSR = Soviet Union. 
gration. After 10 years, only 30% are predicted to work in occupation 
1.4 Thus, after 10 years in Israel, older immigrants earn only half as much 
as comparable native Israelis. 
Because of the sharp changes in earnings with time in Israel and the 
endogeneity of wages and jobs, whereby currently low wages may be 
traded for higher wages in the future, the appropriate summary statistic 
of earnings loss is the difference in the expected discounted present value 
of actual and potential earnings over the immigrants' remaining working 
life. Table 8 describes the main findings for this summary measure. The 
estimated lifetime earnings loss (potential2 - actual) is US$253,200. This 
loss constitutes 57% of the lifetime earnings that these immigrants would 
have obtained had they been native Israelis with the same measured at- 
tributes. The estimated lifetime loss is thus quite substantial. Most of the 
loss, US$190,900, can be attributed to the fact that immigrants are paid 
lower wages than Israelis on the same jobs, especially in the early years 
4 The corresponding figures for younger immigrants are 34%, 46%, and 60% 
predicted to be working in occupation 1 in Israel 5, 10, and 25 years, respectively, 
after immigration. 
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after arrival. This loss constitutes 43% of total potential lifetime earnings. 
The lifetime loss of earnings because of frictions in the labor market 
(nonemployment and job distribution mismatch) is US$62,300, which 
constitutes 14% of total potential lifetime earnings. 
The estimated lifetime earnings loss varies substantially among immi- 
grants. Immigrants with more schooling tend to have higher total losses. 
Given the strong correlation between schooling levels and occupation, 
immigrants who worked in occupations 1 and 2 in the former USSR also 
suffer higher total losses. The figures show that physicians have higher 
losses than engineers, older immigrants have higher losses than younger 
immigrants, and losses increase with later arrival cohorts. 
In order to gauge the relative importance of job distribution mismatch 
and a lower market valuation of imported skills, the table decomposes 
the total loss into the loss resulting from frictions and the loss resulting 
from prices. The estimates indicate that the loss resulting from prices is, 
generally, far more important. This mainly results from the lower returns 
to imported schooling.45 The difference between the loss resulting from 
frictions and the loss resulting from prices is greatest for physicians. Im- 
migrant physicians obtain jobs in the medical profession rather quickly 
but earn much lower wages than do native physicians.46 The smallest 
difference between the loss resulting from frictions and the loss resulting 
from prices is for engineers. The large number of immigrants with en- 
gineering degrees nearly doubled the total stock of engineers in Israel. 
This group thus faces special difficulties obtaining engineering jobs.47 
The lifetime earnings loss calculations aim at estimating the social loss 
of output to the receiving country associated with the movement of human 
capital across labor markets. For this reason, the loss calculations do not 
include the benefits that immigrants receive when nonemployed nor the 
monetary value of nonmonetary benefits when employed. Further, the 
wages of Israelis are used as a benchmark. Although the model contains 
an equivalence scale that transforms the schooling of immigrants to local 
schooling, there may still be unaccounted for differences in the quality 
of schooling acquired locally and abroad. Moreover, the counterfactual 
exercises do not account for possible macroeffects on the Israeli labor 
4 Other studies have also found a higher rate of return for locally acquired 
schooling; see Eckstein and Weiss (1998) and Friedberg (2001). 
46 The national health system considerably expanded in the wake of the mass 
immigration from the former USSR. 
4 Immigrants with 13-14 years of schooling (that generally come from occu- 
pation 2 in the former USSR) suffer higher relative losses because of prices than 
do immigrants with 15 years of schooling. This results from the relatively lower 
actual earnings of the former group in occupation 3 in Israel, the occupation in 
which many of these immigrants find employment. 
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market and wage structure." For these reasons, the potential earnings of 
the recent immigrants may be overstated when they are attributed to the 
current earnings of natives with the same observable characteristics. There- 
fore, the estimated losses among the different groups are an upper bound 
on actual losses."49 We thus have more confidence in the ranking of the 
losses across groups of immigrants with different attributes than in the 
actual magnitude of the loss. 
Recall that the model assumes a high annual real discount rate of 6% 
to capture the borrowing constraint facing immigrants who came to Israel 
with no assets. This fact should not prevent the use of an appropriate 
"social" discount rate to evaluate the social loss associated with immi- 
gration. As displayed in the last two rows of table 8, the relative losses 
are only slightly affected by using an annual real discount rate of 3% to 
evaluate the discounted present value. However, if immigrants had better 
access to the capital market and had faced an interest rate of 3%, there 
would have been a marked effect on their choices and the estimated pa- 
rameters of the model. 
IX. Conclusions 
This article examines the process of entry of highly skilled immigrants 
into the Israeli labor market, using panel data on several cohorts of recent 
immigrants from the former USSR. The main emphasis in the article is 
on the occupational choices of immigrants who arrive with different skills 
and at different points in their life cycle. This study does not investigate 
the reasons for wage growth within occupations and jobs but explicitly 
models how immigrants adjust their choices to the expected rise in their 
wages with the passage of time. 
As has been demonstrated, a simple on-the-job search model, cast as 
a finite-horizon discrete choice dynamic programming problem under 
uncertainty, captures quite well the observed dynamics of occupational 
choice during the first 6 years in Israel. The dynamics consist of a speedy 
entry into the labor force and an initial phase of work at low-skill oc- 
cupations followed by a gradual occupational upgrading. The model ex- 
plains the changing proportions of immigrants working in different oc- 
cupations in Israel without relying on time effects in job offer 
probabilities. The sharp increase in the proportion of immigrants working 
in low-skill jobs results from the willingness of immigrants with high 
schooling levels and previous work experience in high-skill occupations 
in the former USSR to work in low-skill jobs in Israel. The subsequent 
decrease in the proportion working in low-skill jobs results from the 
48 The behavioral model is cast in a partial-equilibrium framework. 
4 Biases in the separately estimated immigrant and native wage functions, because 
of selection or unmeasured characteristics, also reduce our estimates' accuracy. 
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gradual transitions of these highly skilled immigrants to jobs in high-skill 
occupations. Permanent unobserved heterogeneity among immigrants is 
important in explaining the observed declining exit rates from nonem- 
ployment. Immigrants with high exit rates from nonemployment consti- 
tute the majority without jobs in the early months after immigration. As 
these immigrants leave nonemployment, the population of the nonem- 
ployed is increasingly made up of immigrants with very poor employment 
prospects. The model is also capable of explaining the declining reentry 
rates into nonemployment. Nonemployment reentry rates decline over 
time as wage growth on the job raises the opportunity cost of searching 
efficiently for better job opportunities from nonemployment. 
The estimated parameters of the behavioral model, together with in- 
formation on the wages of immigrants from earlier waves, are used to 
examine the speed of wage convergence between immigrants and natives. 
The simulation of an occupational path and associated wages for each 
immigrant on arrival to the host country and until retirement suggests 
that the earnings of recently arrived immigrants will slowly approach the 
earnings of comparable natives. However, the sharp growth in earnings 
combined with the heterogeneity in age at entry suggest the use of the 
discounted present value of lifetime earnings as a better summary measure 
of economic performance in the new country. The lifetime earnings pre- 
dicted by the model are thus compared with the hypothetical lifetime 
earnings that immigrants would have obtained had their imported ob- 
servable skills been valued, from the time of arrival, in the same way as 
skills of comparable natives with the same labor market experience and 
schooling. The results indicate a large gap between actual and potential 
lifetime earnings measures. On average, immigrants from the former USSR 
to Israel can expect lifetime earnings to fall short of the lifetime earnings 
of comparable natives by 57%. Of this figure, 14 percentage points reflect 
frictions associated with nonemployment and job distribution mismatch, 
and 43 percentage points reflect the gradual adaptation of schooling and 
experience imported from the former USSR to the Israeli labor market. 
Our interpretation of these findings is that because of the lack of infor- 
mation that employers have on the quality of newly arrived immigrants 
and that immigrants have of their opportunities in the new labor market, 
and because of the need for complementary local capital (such as language, 
social connections, and familiarity with local institutions), there is, neces- 
sarily, a gradual process of adjustment and adaptation. The speed of ad- 
justment depends on market conditions and the choices made by the im- 
migrants, which interact in a complicated way. It is not clear whether, and 
to what extent, there are market failures in this process and whether there 
is some policy that could reduce the social loss. It is possible that limited 
borrowing capacity prevents immigrants from making the required local 
investment in on-the-job training, which should be the main vehicle for 
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the acquisition of local general human capital. There is, however, no simple 
way to ascertain the quantitative importance of this latter consideration. 
Appendix A 
Table Al 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
Representative Sample of Combined 
Sample Engineers Sample 
Variable Name Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Schooling0 14.6 2.7 16.4 1.6 15.8 2.2 
Experienceo 16.6 8.3 18.6 8.4 17.8 8.4 
Ageo 38.5 8.3 42.0 8.7 40.8 8.7 
Ageo > 40 40.1 58.4 51.8 
Occupationo 1 56.3 100.0 84.3 
Occupationo 2 12.9 .0 4.6 
Occupationo 3 30.8 .0 11.1 
Engineero 25.7 100.0 73.4 
Physiciano 5.7 .0 2.0 
Cohort 1989-90 59.4 41.5 47.9 
Cohort 1991 37.8 19.5 26.1 
Cohort 1992-95 2.8 19.0 26.0 
Knowledge of Hebrew 76.8 69.3 71.5 
Months in Israel 41.4 14.6 46.7 16.5 44.8 16.0 
Months having no job 11.7 10.3 11.4 10.9 11.5 10.7 
Months in occupation 1 5.1 12.4 9.3 18.1 7.8 16.4 
Months in occupation 2 3.0 9.3 2.5 9.3 2.7 9.3 
Months in occupation 3 21.6 18.0 23.5 19.3 22.8 18.8 
Wage observations = 0 54 126 180 
Wage observations = 1 102 571 673 
Wage observations > 1 233 0 233 
Average monthly wage 2,919 1,392 3,740 1,738 3,305 1,616 
Wage observations 646 571 1,217 
Net wages (%) 60.8 26.3 44.6 
No. of immigrants 389 697 1,086 
NOTE.--A variable with a subscript of 0 indicates value on arrival. 
Table A2 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Asymptotic t Values 
Wage Offer Functions 
Nonmonetary Returns 
Terminal Value Functions 
(w,,, n,,,, V,,,) 
Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Occupation 3 No Job 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
In w,,: Constant 7.64762 13.13 7.70313 40.23 7.79090 76.02 . . .. 
Job (s) .03308 3.63 .03308 ... .01059 4.46 .. ... 
Month (t) .00665 4.93 .00665 ... .00649 7.52 .. . 
Tpe 1 -.15661 -.42 -.73910 -1.65 -1.12593 -11.41 .. ... 
e 2 -.38857 -10.00 -.16286 -2.02 -.35763 -13.07 .. ... 
Schooling0. (so) -.01363 -2.01 -.02899 -2.58 -.00540 -1.05 .. . 
Experience0 .00370 .58 .01354 1.82 .00190 .35 .. ... 
Experience2 -.00037 -2.13 -.00064 -2.83 -.00023 -1.59 .. ... 
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Table A2 (Continued) 
Wage Offer Functions 
Nonmonetary Returns 
Terminal Value Functions 
(ws,,, ns,,, V,,73) 
Occupation 1 Occupation 2 Occupation 3 No Job 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Occupation0 1 .19038 .33 .05910 .90 .06580 1.81 ... 
Occupation0 2 .03306 .05 .05190 .64 -.09450 -1.91 ... 
Engineer0 .05546 1.29 .23359 3.79 .06949 1.83 ... 
Physician0 -.21246 -1.94 .02834 .10 -.24827 -2.42 ... 
19910 .00117 .05 .00117 ... -.00116 -.05 
... 
>19910 .00162 .05 .00162 ... .01011 .28 ... 
Representative 
sample .08997 2.33 .08997 ... .08997 . .. 
Representative 
sample x 
net -.13315 -3.86 -.13315 ... -.13315 .. . 
Engineers' sam- 
ple x net -.20042 -5.80 -.20042 ... -.20042 ... ... 
In(a) -1.08153 -21.53 -1.32353 -12.79 -1.27618 -46.52 ... 
n,,,: 
k, .00387 .01 .15442 .36 .16576 .40 
. 
.36891 1.24 k4l ... .... ....... .... ... .36891 .24 
k42 ... ... ... ... ... ... .05173 .12 
v 3,267 2.03 3,267 ... 3,267 ... 3,267 ... 
V,-73: y, -1.49330 -6.38 -1.51262 -5.85 -1.40043 -6.39 ... 
Job Offer Probabilities 
Job Termination Probabilities 
(X,k,, 4, (s* > s), ,) 
Xlkt: No job -5.19917 -5.61 -3.84230 -9.86 -1.69416 -19.57 
Occupation 1 -5.52473 -5.93 -5.51386 -8.88 -5.51386 
Occupation 2 -6.10825 -6.68 -3.55543 -7.79 -3.94459 -8.83 
Occupation 3 -7.19802 -7.66 -5.25765 -12.68 -3.01802 -33.34 
Type 1 -2.83216 -2.85 -2.05430 -2.56 -1.60270 -9.15 
Type 2 -1.02175 -3.05 -.24861 -.83 .21600 2.62 
Age, > 40 -.27582 -2.57 -.36479 -1.98 -.02991 -.56 
Occupation, 1 2.48364 2.65 -.01723 -.03 -.28822 -2.90 
Occupation, 2 .62551 .51 .52499 1.20 -.04304 -.36 
Engineer, -.27344 -1.40 .00486 .01 -.15502 -1.83 
Physician, .12819 .35 -.05532 -.09 -1.21266 -3.87 
19910 .00737 .05 -.40283 -1.86 .33688 5.94 
>19910 -.28445 -1.79 -.34133 -1.21 .47355 6.60 
4,(s* > s): 
a 10.07162 34.73 10.07162 ... 10.07162 ... 
i, .45638 22.26 .27028 9.96 .08005 4.28 
v .40057 4.85 .40057 ... .20905 10.68 
6,: Ca, -5.62635 -24.63 -4.50681 -20.17 -5.14436 -22.72 
Type Probabilities 
Type 1 Type 2 
Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Constant -2.43253 -10.28 -1.51139 -5.36 
Representative 
sample -.05924 -.14 1.21765 3.77 
NOTE. 
-Representative sample and engineers' sample are indicators for the sample from which the wage 
observation was taken. Net indicates net of taxes. Representative sample, engineers' sample, and net ap- 
pear in the measurement error density, not in w,t,. n,, = b, + ve,,, where b,, = (ek - 1)w,,,,j = 1,2,3 and 
b4t 
= 
580e..o.ol+k42.Cro2. 
V173 
= [(1 + q )/(1 - q)](w,,73 + n,73)exp(y,). X,k, = exp(akx,)/[l + Ek= exp(akx1)], b (s* > s) = exp(3,,o/v - s/vly + a/v)/[1 + exp(3,,o/v 
- 
s/vly + a/v)], 6, = exp(a,)/[1 + exp (a,)], and the type 
probabilities are multinomial logit. 
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Appendix B 
Dynamic Program for Out of Sample Predictions 
In order to calculate actual and potential earnings beyond the sample 
period, in a computationally practical way, a period length of 1 year is 
assumed in the simulation of the model beyond month 72 and until re- 
tirement at age 65. Further, since it is not possible to identify quadratic 
effects on wage growth within the sample period and, thus, to predict 
wage offers reliably beyond month 72, the wage offer functions in the 
yearly model are replaced by wage functions estimated separately, using 
data on the annual earnings of previous waves of immigrants from the 
former USSR. The regression specification is reported in Weiss et al. 2001. 
In the out-of-sample predictions, there are no pure time effects. The 
growth in wages is attributed to accumulation of experience and the rising 
prices of imported skills. 
The imported wage functions in the yearly model do not contaminate 
the simulated job choices in months. The monthly model and the yearly 
model are disconnected by separate backward recursions. The backward 
recursion and subsequent simulation of the monthly model uses the ter- 
minal value functions, as in estimation. The estimated monthly wage offer 
functions do, however, influence job choices in the yearly model. The 
ratio of the wage offer in each job in month 73, according the estimated 
monthly model, to the wage offer in each job in month 73, according to 
the out-of-sample regression, is used to adjust the yearly wage offers. Let 
this ratio be denoted by wF73/w4s7 3. The yearly wage offers in each job, 
in each year, are multiplied by 
w"73/wf• •. Estimated monthly job offer probabilities must also be transformed 
into yearly equivalents for the yearly model. We transformed the monthly 
job offer probabilities into yearly job offer probabilities as follows: let q 
be the probability of meeting an employer in a particular month where 
q = 1- h j2, - X- X3t. The probability that the person will meet an 
employer in occupation k once during the year (i.e., in one of n months) 
is X;,k(1 + + q+ + 2 + qn1) = Xjkt[(1 - qn)/(1 - q)]. The probability 
that the person will receive no offer is q". Clearly, 
1-q" 
1i-q 1- q Xl +X1 
2 q) X+j2t Xj3t n+ qn = 1, 
since q = 1 - 1, - Xj2t - j3 The other two components of the job offer 
probability, P(s) and cI(s'" > s), are not dependent on the length of the 
period and, therefore, do not require adjustment. 
It is interesting to note that connecting the monthly and yearly models 
by a full backward recursion starting from age 65 does not substantially 
change the simulation results. The terminal value functions estimated in 
the model are thus consistent with the value functions generated using 
the imported wage functions, with correction factor 
w,/s~z, 
and the 
transformed monthly job offer probabilities. 
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